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Jury misconduct or irregularity
By Donna Spears

The expression 'jury misconduct'
is commonplace in American
jurisprudence and covers a wide
range of conduct from the juries
having access to additional materials
to the coercion of fellow jurors by
violence.
In Australia, courts have proceeded with more
caution, avoiding the general term 'misconduct'
and instead referring to all such events as
'irregularities' unless the character of the
juror conduct is such that the disapprobation
'misconduct' is clearly justified.
Dr Donna Spears is aLecturer in
Criminal Law at [he University of New
South Wales and a barrister practising
mainly in criminal law. She has a
background in ins[itu[ional research
and her current research imerests are in
[he areas of criminal procedure and [he
role of judicial discretion in sentencing.

A basic principle of the Australian criminal
justice system is that no person shall be
convicted of a crime except after a fair trial
according to law. One touchstone of a fair
trial is an impartial trier of fact and, in the
context of a trial by jury, that means a jury
capable and willing to decide the case solely
on the evidence properly before it. A trial is
not necessarily unfair because it is less than
perfect1 but it is unfair if it involves a risk of
the accused being improperly convicted. The
courts have stressed that the evaluation of
such irregularities should proceed on the basis
that jurors properly perform their tasks, are true
to their oaths and comply with the directions
of the trial judge, as to do otherwise would
mean that there was no point in having criminal
trials. 2
Critics of the jury system point to the potential
of jury irregularities and misconduct to allow
extraneous considerations to affect the jury's
deliberations and thus impinge upon the right
of the accused to a fair trial. They suggest that
jury trials are inherently tinged with unfairness.
This article looks at the types of irregularities
that have been identified through the case law
and examines the way in which the existing law
and processes operate to ensure a fair trial.

G

Detecting and dealing with irregularity
At the beginning of a criminal trial the jurors are
instructed to make their decisions on the basis
of the evidence alone and to set aside any
prejudices. They are also told to bring to the
judge's attention any instances of irregularity.
Most documented instances are either
observed by third parties to the jury (such as
lawyers, the accused or sheriff's officers) or by
jurors themselves. Jurors are often in the best
position to detect misconduct or irregularity on
the part of other jurors or in relation to incidents
that affect the jury as a whole. The problem is
that jury misconduct is often insidious-if jurors
observe or participate in misconduct and then
remain silent, such conduct may never come
to light. Legal research can tell us much about
reported instances of misconduct but it cannot
identify individual instances (or the prevalence)
of unreported misconduct.
Once an allegation of misconduct is made
during the course of a trial, the focus shifts
to the conduct of the trial judge. A trial judge
has power to take evidence in relation to the
allegation (if this is desirable) and then
(a)

do nothing-on the basis that further
mention of a minor irregularity will
give it more significance than it
actually warrants and itself may
provoke or induce further problems;

(b)

give clear and unambiguous
directions to the jury to correct
or remove the possibility of prejudice
to a defendant; or

(c)

discharge a juror or the whole jury
if such a course is warranted in the
interests of justice.
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In deciding whether to discharge a juror for
bias the test is whether the circumstances of
the relevant incident would give a fair-minded
obseNer a reasonable apprehension of a
lack of impartiality on the part of the juror.3 In
some jurisdictions, this is also the test for jury
irregularity4 but in others a separate test has
developed S Despite the variation in wording
and emphasis, these tests appear to operate
in much the same fashion with a basic concern
as to whether the accused has been deprived
of a fair trial resulting in a miscarriage of
justice.
Even if jurors do come forward, the
identification of misbehaviour can be made
more problematic by reason of the rule that
courts will refuse to receive evidence from
a juror about the course of deliberations in
the jury room (sometimes referred to as the
'jury secrecy' rule).6 This common law rule
still exists, albeit in modified form, in many
jurisdictions and is based on public policy
considerations including the need to promote
full and frank discussion among jurors, the
need for finality of the verdict, the need to
protect jurors from harassment, pressure,
censure and reprisal and the need to maintain
public confidence in juries.? American courts
and jurists have also suggested that it
reduces incentives for jury tampering. S The
rule has a limited scope. It has been held to
preclude proof of the subject matter of juror
deliberations (such as a juror being racially
prejudiced)9 but not proof of irregularity in
proceedings extrinsic to the matters being
deliberated on (such as material being given to
a jury by mistake).1o

Types of irregularity
In order to understand how courts regulate jury
irregularity it is useful to explore some of the
actual situations raised in the case law.

1. Juror contact or relationships with witnesses
and other persons. Australian courts have taken
a fairly robust view about casual or innocent
conversations between jurors and other court
personnel. A brief conversation between a juror
and Crown counsel about the weather did not
result in a retrial. 11 Nor did polite conversation
between a juror and a judge's associate at
a private party.12 The possession of mobile
phones by jurors during deliberation did not
justify the discharge of the jury.13 The giving
of flowers to the mother of the deceased by
a juror was held not to amount to evidence of

either juror bias or misconduc!.14 However a
conviction was quashed where a juror during
a recess approached a detective and asked
him questions about the identity of another
detective who was a witness at the trial The
possibility that the juror's question might have
reflected an opinion about the reliability of the
other detective as a witness based on prior
information was enough.1S Likewise a sheriff's
officer expressing his own view to the jury that
the accused was guilty led to mistrial. 16

2. Unauthorised visits to crime scenes. There
have been several reported instances of jurors
visiting crime scenes outside court hours. A
visit by several jurors to the general area of a
hotel in Hobart referred to in evidence without
any detailed measurements or timings was
held not to warrant a new trial. 17 By way of
contrast, a new trial was ordered where two
jurors conducted their own viewing of an
alleged rape scene for the apparent purpose of
assessing for themselves the circumstances of
complainant's identification of the accused. 1s

Tile courts have
traditionally frowned on
attempts by jurors to
solicit information from
sources outside the
courtroom. b,

b,

3. Unauthorised material or information present
in the jury room. The main factor in assessing
unauthorised material appears to be whether
the irregularity is material, that is, whether it
ultimately made a difference to the verdict
returned. A book about guns in a murder trial
where a gun was used was not held to be
material because the information it contained
was the same as that which was put in
evidence during the trial. 19 A newspaper article
about unsworn statements brought into the
jury room by a juror in a trial where the two
accused had made unsworn statements was
held to be slightly material but too remote to
justify a retrial. 2o The court suggested that a
more appropriate course for the jury would
have been to ask for specific directions from
the trial judge. On the other hand, when pieces
of paper containing extremely prejudicial
material were inadvertently tendered inside a
handbag owned by the deceased in a murder
trial, a retrial was ordered because the material
was capable of conveying information to the
jury about the propensities of the accused. 21
Likewise, where prejudicial subpoenaed
documents were given to the jury by mistake
the conviction could not be sustained. 22
The courts have traditionally frowned on
attempts by jurors to solicit information from
sources outside the courtroom. The so-called
digital age with its almost instantaneous
public access to vast amounts of information
via devices such as the internet and mobile
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phones has provided more scope for such
research. Jurors in a trial of an accused for
the murder of his first wife discovered via the
internet that he had previously been tried and
convicted of the murder of the first wife and
also that he had been charged and acquitted
of the murder of his second wife. 23 The
irregularity as to the discovery of the charge
of murder of the second wife was held to
be potentially prejudicial as it risked the jury
engaging in tendency and/or coincidence
reasoning or risked raising bad character when
that sort of evidence would have otherwise
been inadmissible.

6 Despite clear
warnings, jurors do
sometimes cross
the evidentiary
boundaries and go
out investigating.
Unlike the jurors
of the past, jurors
today know how to
find out more. 6

o

Preventative measures
In most jurisdictions the courts and the
legislature have taken significant steps to
prevent or at least reduce the potential
for jury irregularities. Juries are now given
strong and comprehensive directions at the
commencement of a trial as to their duties
and responsibilities. They ar~ also told about
safeguards for the jury including the existence
of specific offences such as jury tampering and
contempt. They are warned not to undertake
any independent investigations or use any
material or research tool to access legal
databases, earlier court decisions, and/or any
other material relating to any matter ariSing
in the trial. In two states, jurors are advised
that it is an offence for a juror in a criminal
trial to conduct independent research. 24 They
are also told that the reason that they are
not permitted to make such inquiries is that
to do so would change their role from that
of impartial jurors to investigators, and lead
them to take into account material that was not
properly placed before them as evidence, of
which those representing the Crown and the
accused would be unaware and unable to test.
They are warned that the consequences of
such prohibited conduct may be that the jury
is discharged or its verdict later overturned.
In addition, most courts now exercise care in
deciding which judgments to place on court
web sites and provide to other legal publishers
so as to minimise the opportunity for jurors
to obtain information about persons currently
facing trial.
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Comment
The role of jurors in criminal trials has been
traditionally divided into two distinct but
overlapping phases: in the first the evidence
is adduced before them; and it is only in the
second phase that they are asked to act, that
is deliberate, and come to a verdict. Of course
jurors can and increasingly do ask questions
within the framework of the traditional trial
but clearly sometimes that is not sufficient.
Despite clear warnings, jurors do sometimes
cross the evidentiary boundaries and go out
investigating. Unlike the jurors of the past,
jurors today know how to find out more. One
important question that should be asked is
why do they do it. Jurors are obviously not
satisfied with the state of the evidence and
want to know or find out more. There is nothing
that can be inferred from any of the Australian
cases (in part due to the exclusionary rule) to
suggest the wayward jurors were deviating
from their sworn task of determining the guilt
or innocence of the accused. They all appear
to be attempting to do their authorised work,
albeit in an unauthorised mode.
Psychologists have suggested that people
need to believe the world is a just place
in which individuals get what they deseNe
and so they respond to wrongs by doing
everything they can to procure an appropriate
remedy.25 If this is correct, then jurors go out
investigating in order to bring perpetrators
to justice or equally to ensure that the
innocent are not wrongfully convicted. They
are sometimes simply not content to stay in
the more passive role allocated to them. The
other factor that may drive jurors to search for
additional evidence, be it by research or other
investigation, is a belief in the existence of
other physical or scientific evidence capable
of resolving particular factual issues. Some
commentators have suggested that TV shows
like CSt have fortified such beliefs, although
this effect has been questioned. 26
Bearing this in mind, ihe courts themselves
may have a role to play in alleviating
juror frustration by improving the lines of
communication between judge and jury. The
stronger directions on irregularity that include
reference to the possible prejudice to the
parties and procedural consequences have
been a move in the r!ght direction. I want to
make a more radical suggestion-that judges
might admit upfront to juries that sometimes
things will be kept from them, not by

.-------------------------------------------------~~------

incompetence, oversight or error, but because
of rules of evidence that are there to ensure
that justice is done. It can only further t~le
course of justice for jurors to understand that
the search for truth must not be pursued to the
exclusion of all else.
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